Alex Tordjman (Stanford University)
Title : Corruption in Auctions: a Foundation for the Second-Price and Descending Clock Auctions
Alice Mazzacurati (Paris School of Economics & École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales)
Title : Job Matching with Unemployment Benefits
This paper studies optimal design of unemployment benefits within a Crawford–Knoer framework. First, we provide a new characterization of the worker-optimal stable allocation and show how an increase in the benefits of an unemployed worker propagates through the market. To capture the propagation, we construct a directed acyclic graph that enables the identification of workers whose targeting maximizes aggregate workers’ welfare. Building on this network structure, we design the optimal policy that maximizes workers’ welfare using a modified version of the eating algorithm by [Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001]. Then, we study how the introduction of unemployment benefits affects the set of stable allocations and derive design recommendations.
Colin Cleveland (King's College London)
Title : The Complexity of Strategic Behavior in Primary Elections
David Ryzák (Czech technical university in Prague)
Title : Tractable Class of Cooperative Games on Directed Networks
Emile Martinez (IRIT, Univeristé Toulouse Capitole)
Title : Prophet Inequalities with Uncertain Acceptance
Frances Sealy (Durham University)
Title : The Existence of Fair and Stable International Environmental Agreements
Kassian Köck (Technical University of Munich)
Title : Deep Reinforcement Learning Finds Bayes–Nash Equilibrium in Competitive Newsvendor Problems
Polina Borisova (Paris School of Economics)
Title : TikToks vs. Movies: How Content Length Shapes Engagement
Roberto Bellucci (University of Bonn)
Title : On Uncertainty Representation in Principal-Agent Models
Victor Perez (Université Mohammed VI Polytechnique)
Title : Bayesian Monopoly Regulation: Bunching, Exclusion and Countervailing Incentives in Multidimensional Screening