Strategic Communication and Information Transmission

Content

Module 1. Cheap talk and persuasion (slides)

• Bayesian games
• Value of Information
• Cheap Talk
• Bayesian Persuasion

 Module 2. Mediation and signaling (slides)

• Cheap talk and persuasion with transparent motives
• Mediated communication
• Costly signaling
• Competitive information disclosure

References:

1. Robert J. Aumann and Sergiu Hart. Long cheap talk. Econometrica, 71(6):1619–1660, 2003. 

2. Robert J. Aumann and Michael Maschler, Repeated games with incomplete information, MIT press, 1995. 

3. V. P. Crawford and J. Sobel. Strategic information transmission. Econometrica, 50(6): 1431–1451, 1982. 

4. Francoise Forges. An approach to communication equilibria. Econometrica, 54(6): 1375–1385, 1986. 

5. Francoise Forges. Games with incomplete information: from repetition to cheap talk and persuasion. Annals of Economics and Statistics, (137):3–30, 2020. 

6. Emir Kamenica and Matthew Gentzkow. Bayesian Persuasion. American Economic Review, 101(6):2590–2615, 2011. 

7.  Frederic Koessler, Marie Laclau, and Tristan Tomala.  Interactive Information design, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2022, 47(1), 153-175.

8. Frederic Koessler, Marie Laclau, Jerome Renault and Tristan Tomala.  Long Information design, Theoretical Economics, 2022, 17(2), 883-927.

9. Frederic Koessler, Marie Laclau, and Tristan Tomala. A belief-based approach to signaling. working paper, 2024. 

10. Rida Laraki and Jerome Renault. 2020  Acyclic Gambling Games, Mathematics of Operations Research 45 (4), p.1237-1257, 2020.

11. Jean-Francois Mertens, Sylvain Sorin, and Shmuel Zamir. Repeated games. Cambridge University Press, 2015. 

12. Jean-Francois Mertens and Shmuel Zamir.  S., 1971. The value of two-person zero-sum repeated games with lack of information on both sides, 

13. Roger B. Myerson. Bayesian equilibrium and incentive-compatibility: An introduction. Social goals and social organization: Essays in memory of Elisha Pazner, pages 229–260, 1985. 

14. Jerome Renault, Eilon Solan, and Nicolas Vieille. Dynamic sender–receiver games. Journal of Economic Theory, 148(2):502–534, 2013. 

15. A. M. Spence. Job market signaling. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87:355–374, 1973.